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Out of the ground 
Into the sky 
Out of the sky 
Into the ground 
‘Very Ape’, Nirvana (1993) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Nineteenth century biological treatises are almost unexceptionally beautifully 
crafted works of art, whose closing perorations—respecting the essentials of the 
classical rhetorical cannon—are a never-ending source of literary joy. Darwin’s 
(1859) words at the end of On the Origin of Species are well remembered for this 
reason, but nowadays readers would also certainly be greatly surprised by other 
contemporary masters of the genre, were their works as accessible as Darwin’s 
still are. We are particularly thinking of Richard Owen: For example, the final 
pages of the third and last volume of The Anatomy of Vertebrates (1868), where he 
confesses himself a tough-minded materialist concerning such delicate matters as 
the essence of life or the nature of mind; and, above all, the final section of On the 
Nature of Limbs (1849), a beautiful literary exercise that includes something alike 
to a twin-earth thought experiment. Owen speculates there that given the astro-
nomers’ certainty that basic conditions of other planets and their associated 
satellites might be as beneficial to the proliferation of life forms as those actually 
benefitting it in the Earth, such forms should be not very different from the ones 
we presently know here, as these are constrained by laws of variation affecting a 
restricted array of basic forms that define the realm of the organic. Let us quote 
Owen’s beautiful prose at large: 
 
The naturalist and anatomist, in digesting the knowledge which the astro-
nomer has been able to furnish regarding the planets and the mechanisms of 
the satellites for illuminating the night-season of the distant orbs that 
revolve round our common sun, can hardly avoid speculating on the or-
ganic mechanism that may exist to profit by such sources of light, and which 
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to the Centre de Lingüística Teórica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona—SB).  
Biolinguistics  «  Reviews  « 
 
109 
must exist, if the only conceivable purpose of those beneficent arrangements 
is to be fulfilled. But the laws of light, as of gravitation, being the same in 
Jupiter as here, the eyes of such creatures as may disport in the soft reflected 
beams of its moons will probably be organized on the same dioptric prin-
ciples as those of the animals of a like grade of organization on this earth. 
And the inference as to the possibility of the vertebrate type being the basis 
of the organization of some of the inhabitants of other planets will not 
appear so hazardous, when it is remembered that the orbits or protective 
cavities of the eyes of the Vertebrata of this planet are constructed of modi-
fied vertebræ. Our thoughts are free to soar as far as any legitimate analogy 
may seen to guide them rightly in the boundless ocean of unknown truth. 
And if censure be merited for here indulging, even for a moment, in pure 
speculation, it may, perhaps, be disarmed by the reflection that the dis-
covery of the vertebrate archetype could not fail to suggest to the Anatomist 
many possible modifications of it beyond those that we know to have been 
realized in this little orb of ours.  
 The inspired Writer, the Poet and the Artist alone have been 
privileged to depict such.            (Owen 1849 [2007]: 83–84) 
 
 It is a happy coincidence—as Richard Owen has never been a point of 
reference of Derek Bickerton’s lifelong project of figuring out the origins and evo-
lution of language—that Bickerton’s own peroration in his last book also contains 
a reflection along the same speculative, almost dreamlike mood. Let us also quote 
(from here on, we will refer to Bickerton’s book as MTNN, with page or chapter 
numbers added when appropriate): 
 
[T]here is still a strong possibility that, on any planet that hosts life forms, 
some species that has reached the chimpanzee-dolphin-crow level of cogni-
tive capacity will eventually adopt a niche similar to that occupied by ants, 
bees, and human ancestors on this planet. […] [T]hen other planets with “in-
telligent life” become perhaps unavoidable.  
 In the week these lines were written, Harvard astronomers, analyzing 
new data from the Kepler telescope, estimated that there might be as many 
as 17 billion Earth-size planets in the Milky Way alone, a sizable percentage 
of which would have orbits within a zone congenial to life […]. Earth, far 
from being the galactic anomaly many previously believed, is as ordinary a 
planet as the last common ancestor of apes and humans was an ordinary 
primate. To speculate further is premature, but these findings strongly 
suggest that the array of life forms on these planets may differ little in their 
cognitive spread from those found here, and that consequently “intelligent 
life,” far from being a rare or even unique aberration, may have multiple loci 
throughout the universe.               (MTNN: 273) 
  
 This review of MTNN is mostly devoted to show that what strikes us as a 
happy coincidence is more than a simple matter of literary style. 
 
2. The return of another hopeful monster (or the raise of neo-Owenian bio-
linguistics) 
 
Surely enough, readers may have guessed that Owen and Bickerton are defend-
ing exactly the same stance in their respective texts above: Namely, that given 
patterns of organization unavoidably linked to particular environmental con-
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ditions, the array of conceivable paths of diversification from such patterns must 
be constrained (and radically so) in a law-like manner. Granted that Owen is 
referring to the constrained plasticity of vertebrae to compound structures like 
cavities or limbs, while Bickerton is writing about brains and their associated 
cognitive capacities. But it is an additional happy coincidence that Owen also 
devoted similar reflections to the case of brains. It can be witnessed in passages 
like the following one, which in the original is preceded by an exposition of the 
major morphological distinguishing features of the varyingly complex versions 
of the mammalian brain: 
 
In Man the brain presents as ascensive step in development, higher and 
more strongly marked than that by which the preceding subclass was 
distinguished from the one below it. Nor only do the cerebral hemispheres 
overlap the olfactory lobes and cerebellum, but they extend in advanced of 
the one and further back to the other. Their posterior development is so 
marked that anthropotomists have assigned to that part the character and 
name of a ‘third lobe:’ it is peculiar and common to the genus Homo: equally 
peculiar is the ‘posterior horn of the lateral ventricle’ and the ‘hippocampus 
minor,’ which characterize the hind lobe of each hemisphere. The superficial 
grey matter of the cerebrum, through the number and depth of the 
convolutions, attains its maximum of extent in Man. 
 Peculiar mental powers are associated with this highest form of brain, 
and their consequences wonderfully illustrate the value of the cerebral 
character; according to my estimate of which, I am led to regard the genus 
Homo as not merely a representation of a distinctive order, but of a distinct 
subclass, of the Mammalia, for which I propose the name ARCHENCEPHALA.  
(Owen 1859: 25–26)  
 
 We have only to lament that Owen’s ideas in passages like this one have 
been historically distorted to the point of making them a gross caricature of their 
real import. For Owen’s theses were very clear: (1) that the human brain is but a 
particular variant of the same organ in different species (or “homologues”), the 
diversity of which may be described by means of a few distinctive criteria; (2) 
that, as a matter of observation, this particular variant diverges from its closest 
homologues more than the latter diverge from their corresponding ones down in 
a scale of morphological complexity; and (3) that such a morphological contrast 
correlates with the gulf between the “mental powers” of humans relatively to 
that of the chimpanzee and other quadrumana, as “intelligence” (using now 
Bickerton’s word) is nothing but the organic activity of brains (Balari & Lorenzo 
2013a). More than a century and a half ago, Owen was as convinced as Bickerton 
is today that the “specialness” of humans (“peculiar mental powers are associ-
ated with this highest form of brain,” Owen 1859: 26; “humans have large brains 
with unusual computational capacities,” MTNN: 45) was a matter of fact, not of 
faith. No wonder their solutions to such a defying biological question are con-
structed along very similar lines. As defenders of a self-assumedly Owenian 
project aimed at disentangling some of the most recalcitrant difficulties in order 
to frame the evolutionary understanding of cognition and language within nor-
mal explanatory parameters (Balari & Lorenzo 2013b), we cannot but welcome 
Bickerton’s new and highly promising attempt in a congenial direction.  
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 We want to stress from the start that MTNN is a quantum leap relatively to 
Bickerton’s previous Adam’s Tongue—a failed effort to explain “how humans 
made language, and language made humans,” as the book promised in its 
subtitle (Bickerton 2009). As Bickerton self-acknowledged after a review that we 
targeted to the book (Balari & Lorenzo 2010a), Adam’s Tongue was “about the 
transition from the alingual state that characterizes all other species to something 
that might qualify as a genuine precursor of language” (Bickerton 2010: 128), but 
it had almost nothing to offer beyond that, in clear contradiction with its declared 
purpose. In MTNN Bickerton offers an honest diagnosis of why Adam’s Tongue 
was a flawed project and also a very interesting plot to overcome its many short-
comings.  
 As for the diagnosis, Bickerton coins in the book the suggestive name of 
“Wallace’s Problem” as a shortcut for referring to the problem that threatened to 
leave his original project into a dead end. This apt name reminds us Alfred 
Russel Wallace’s conclusion that such typically human skills as language or 
music, but also some physical characters like the loss of hair or the shape of the 
hand, were far beyond the explanatory scope of Natural Selection (see, for 
example, Wallace 1870, and the valuable comments in Shermer 2002: Ch. 8), the 
idea that Wallace conceived independently of Darwin (Darwin & Wallace 1858). 
Some decades after originally formulating his point, Wallace expounded it with 
the following words:  
 
In [“The limits of natural selection as applied to man”] I apply Darwin’s 
principle of natural selection, acting solely by means of “utilities,” to show 
that certain physical modifications and mental faculties of man could not 
have been acquired through the preservation of useful variations, because 
there is some direct evidence to show that they were not and are not useful in 
the ordinary sense, or, as Professor Lloyd Morgan well puts it, not of “life-
preserving value,” while there is absolutely no evidence to show that they 
were so. In reply, Darwin appealed to the effects of female choice in devel-
oping these characteristics, of which, however, not a particle of evidence is 
to be found among existing savages races.     (Wallace 1908: 212–213) 
 
 “Wallace’s problem” was certainly Bickerton’s problem in Adam’s Tongue, 
for he was incapable to invent a just-so story there able to make sense of the 
releasing of early humans from the state of proto-linguistic communication that, 
according to Bickerton’s tale, living in a confrontational scavenging niche had left 
them into. We will not assess here the plausibility of this latter thesis. It has 
already been the target of enough criticism (Balari & Lorenzo 2010a, Arbib 2011, 
Clark 2011), which Bickerton has decided to plainly ignore in the new book.  
 As for the plot, the main novelty of MTNN is that Bickerton strongly 
adheres to the idea now that no adaptive narrative is capable of dealing with the 
complexities and subtleties not just of full-fledged language, but even of 
interlanguage phenomena like early child language or pidgins in the way of 
becoming creoles. Obviously enough, this does not entail (contra Wallace) that 
for Bickerton, no biological explanation can be offered to such natural develop-
ments. As a further happy coincidence, Bickerton’s line of argumentation again 
converges with that of Owen here, who after wielding some very thoughtful 
criticisms against the power and the scope of Natural Selection (Owen 1860, 1866: 
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Preface, 1868: Ch. XL), largely ignored by today’s historians and philosophers of 
science, articulated an alternative based on the inherently self-organizing 
capacity of organic matter (Balari & Lorenzo, in progress).  
 Bickerton’s recipe for solving Wallace’s problem involves disassembling 
particular languages in order to take apart, on the one hand, a universal com-
ponent made of very basic computational operations and, on the other hand, 
grammar particular rules that complete and repair the former in areas of under-
specification when applied in the communicative uses of language. According to 
Bickerton, the fact that evolutionary linguistics had hitherto been incapable of 
understanding the difference between the former (biological) stratum of 
languages and the latter (cultural) one is the main responsible of the state of 
stagnation of the field, mostly devoted to Byzantine debates between nativist and 
empiricist oriented opinions. In his own words:  
 
In retrospect it seems bizarre that nobody, throughout this debate, proposed 
a principled and systematic distinction between those parts of syntax that 
were biologically given and those that had to be acquired through 
acculturation into one of the many thousands of speech communities.  
 But what you have just read includes, and to a considerable extent 
depends on, the first coherent theory of syntax that makes such a distinction. 
(MTNN: 274) 
 
 Fair enough; but we cannot escape pointing out that the statement in the 
first paragraph is, to say the least, inaccurate: Prior to Bickerton’s book, the 
distinction was at least very clearly established, and along very similar lines, in 
Balari & Lorenzo (2013b), also as a necessary point of departure for an evoluti-
onary understanding of language. Let us quote:  
 
This problem, which we will refer to as the “dual nature of language,” 
concerns a pervading confusion, both in linguistics in general and in 
evolutionary linguistics in particular, between the biological/computational 
system with which all members of the human species are endowed and the 
psychological/cultural systems every member of the species is capable of 
developing—namely, for the lack of a better term, “grammars.” […] The 
issue can be summarized very briefly by stating that it is one thing to 
investigate the origin of FL (with the specific technical meaning we reserve 
for this term here) and another, different thing to speculate on the process, 
contexts, and contingencies that favored the emergence of grammatical 
systems. We regard the former as a strictly organic question, whereas the 
latter concerns the interaction between biology and culture. Our contention 
here is that the former, the organic aspect of language, is basic—actually, 
prior—if we want any just-so story about the invention of grammars to 
make any sense at all, but also if we want to achieve a better understanding 
of language as a whole.          (Balari & Lorenzo 2013b: 7–8) 
 
 Let us also clear up that we are not raising this point here as a question of 
property rights—incidentally, a very common issue in Victorian biology (Rich-
ards 1987). We simply want to underlie it as a further reason to align Bickerton’s 
new ideas with the neo-Owenian current of thought defended in our own book. 
Obviously enough, differences also exist between the respective approaches: For 
instance, Bickerton’s biological level is very close to the barebones of current 
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minimalist analyses (Chomsky 1995, and subsequent works), while our main 
source of inspiration are the barest essentials of the computational/represen-
tational theory of mind of approaches like that of Pylyshyn (1980). As for the 
cultural level, the two approaches are congenial in underscoring its value both in 
individual acquisition and use, but while Bickerton seems to emphasize the 
latter, in Balari & Lorenzo (2013b), we adhere to a primacy thesis theoretically 
favoring the former (Minelli 2003, Balari & Lorenzo, submitted). In this sense, 
Bickerton’s ideas run parallel to other minimalist framed approaches to language 
evolution, like Longa et al. (2011), where it is also stressed the pressure of vocabu-
lary explosion in the emergence of a first stratum of computational complexity 
(Longa et al. 2011: 601–604), as well as the needs of exteriorization as the main 
driving force leading to a further complexity stratum underlying phenomena like 
long-distance dependences, crossed paths, parallelisms, and so on (Longa et al. 
2011: 610–615). But leaving aside details like these, the two approaches are co-
herent enough as to deem them both as neo-Owenian, for they equally give 
support to the idea that brain evolution as to be the site of “unusual compu-
tational capacities” (Bickerton) could not possibly be driven by Natural Selection, 
the alternative being certain spontaneous capacities for reorganization. In Bicker-
ton’s words:  
 
Indeed whether the brain shows diversity within uniformity or uniformity 
within diversity seems to depend not on any kind of external pressure but 
solely on the brain’s ability to optimize its own resources.     (MTNN: 119)  
 
 In one of the passages where Owen confronted the means by which the 
complementary mechanisms of Natural Selection and of Derivation (Owen’s 
name for his suggested principle) worked, he wrote the following:  
 
‘Derivation’ holds that every species changes, in time, by virtue of inherent 
tendencies thereto. ‘Natural Selection’ holds that no such change takes place 
without the influence of altered external circumstances educing or selecting 
such change.                 (Owen 1868: 808)  
 
 Clearly enough, Bickerton’s is a derivative rather than a selective theory—
also in concurrence with Balari & Lorenzo (2013b) here. Again, there exist some 
differences between one approach and the other as in, for example, the role the 
latter concede to standard evo-devo mechanisms in driving the process, where 
the former shows much more confidence in ‘third factor’ (Chomsky 2005) prin-
ciples of sorts alone to the same effect. But, as an aside, let us say that we under-
stand (even if we do not share) Bickerton’s (MTNN: 51–53) distrust in the appli-
cation of Evo-Devo to the case of language, for it is actually the case that it has 
hitherto been vacuously appealed to more than truly applied in the evolutionary 
explanation of the language faculty (as an example see Chomsky 2010, and for a 
critical appraisal Benítez-Burraco & Longa 2010). We however think that Balari & 
Lorenzo (2013b: Ch. 6) proves that this is not necessarily so.  
 
3. A brief note on the primacy of the developmental role 
 
In the preceding paragraphs, we have highlighted a number of points of contact 
between Bickerton’s proposals and the ones set forth by ourselves in Balari & 
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Lorenzo (2013b). Our main motivation, so far, was to emphasize that the solution 
to Wallace’s problem is more Owenian than Darwinian, both in form and in spirit 
and, hence, closer to Evo-Devo contentions than Bickerton actually suspects. In 
doing so, we have mostly enumerated those elements where Bickerton’s work 
and ours either agree or diverge, without paying much attention to the details. In 
the following, however, we would like to concentrate on one particular aspect of 
MTNN which, in our opinion, is perhaps the most interesting and welcome of the 
whole book: Bickerton’s approach to variation, acquisition, and creolization.  
 In the first chapter of our Computational Phenotypes, right after expressing 
the need to recognize the dual nature of language in the terms illustrated by the 
quotation above, we delineated a very sketchy proposal as to how grammatical 
systems might have emerged, with some hints also as to how the problem of 
variation could be dealt with. Our proposal boiled down to two main assumpti-
ons: (1) that no selective theory based on the idea of the optimization of commu-
nication could ever be able to explain the presence of such grammatical features 
as case o agreement markers in some languages but not in others; and (2) that 
such features could nevertheless be understood as accidental products of the 
process of acquiring language, for which they acted as scaffolds and which were 
later preserved in the adult system for no specific purpose apart perhaps from 
this developmental role (Balari & Lorenzo 2013b: 15–20).  
 To be sure, our proposal did not go beyond this promissory note and the 
(implicit) indication that this was a topic for future research. Computational 
Phenotypes was, after all, a book intended to provide a detailed account of the 
origins of language as a computational system. In MTNN, however, Bickerton, in 
his clear bet for breadth rather than depth, devotes the second part of his book to 
outline a much more articulated proposal to explain the emergence of grammars 
and variation (MTNN: Chs. 6–8). Now, if we took the two or three pieces of the 
puzzle that we set out on the table and then added those contributed by Bicker-
ton, the whole would conform a rather coherent and consistent image, with just a 
little distortion perhaps at the edges.  
 To summarize Bickerton’s position, he doesn’t believe either in the adap-
tive value of a single grammatical feature, although he nonetheless does believe 
that a collection of such features inserted in an otherwise greatly underspecified 
grammar would make of it a better tool for communication that would, in turn, 
“confer enhanced fitness” (MTNN: 153) to those possessing it. Thus, grammatical 
features would have emerged in order to repair the radical underspecification left 
by the biological component of language through what Bickerton describes as a 
speaker–hearer arms-race of sorts, where speakers struggle to minimize costs 
during the production of utterances and hearers wanting a maximal precision in 
order to prevent misunderstanding.  
 At first glance, this looks like a model where grammatical features are an 
adult invention introduced by horizontal diffusion (Labov 2010: Ch. 15) through 
several rounds of more or less fruitful acts of communication. But this cannot be 
so if we take into account the chapter Bickerton devotes to creoles. In chapter 8 of 
MTNN, Bickerton presents a revival of his Language Bioprogram Hypothesis 
(Bickerton 1981), now refurbished to fit into the more streamlined conception of 
UG he presents in the first part of the book. Refurbishments are minimal and 
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Bickerton makes a strong case for his original idea that creoles are the product of 
children acquiring a pidgin as their first language in a process that is completed 
in a single generation. We are no creolists and we can therefore not fully evaluate 
the details, but it is certainly the case that the picture Bickerton portrays in 
MTNN fits much better than the alternative offered by his adversaries into the 
well-grounded assumption that variation and change are to a large extent the 
product of vertical transmission from parents to children (Ringe et al. 2002, Labov 
2010). Note that this position is accepted even by those, like Peter Trudgill, for 
example, who see in culture a strong factor influencing grammatical structure 
(Trudgill 2004, 2011).  
 Accordingly, Bickerton’s story would run like this: Grammatical systems 
would have emerged through transmission of a pidgin-like protolanguage from 
parents to children as repair strategies to fill in the gaps left by a highly under-
specified UG component. It remains an open question whether, as in the case of 
creoles, this would have occurred in a single generation or in subsequent trans-
mission rounds as suggested by Kirby’s Iterated Learning models (e.g., Kirby 
2013); but this is just a secondary question that would certainly not undermine 
Bickerton’s model as it is quite likely that the sociolinguistic and biological 
context of our ancestors was not comparable to the one giving rise to creoles.  
 We would like however to point out what we believe to be a flaw in this 
scenario. Bickerton throughout the second part of MTNN seems to hesitate 
between settling on a “facilitation-of-processing” role versus a “facilitation-of-
efficient-communication” role for grammatical features. Granted, these are per-
haps two sides of the same coin, but we suspect that both introduce an ecological 
factor in the explanation that runs the risk of seriously undermine Bickerton’s 
explanation of the nature of linguistic variation. The point is simple and can be 
summarized with the following question: If what motivated grammatical 
features was just the need for much more efficient communication and under-
standing, why don’t we observe what in general is observed when similar ecolo-
gical conditions occur, namely convergence; or, in other words, why don’t all 
languages have case, agreement, etc.? Indeed, why is there variation at all?  
 Obviously enough, the question would deserve a full-length monograph, 
but we would like to suggest here what we see as the key to solve it one day: 
Grammatical features emerged (where they emerged) accidentally in the course 
of language development during vertical transmission. Where they were present, 
they acted as “ontogenetic adaptations” (Oppenheim 1981, 1984) capable of 
“scaffolding” (Caporael et al. 2014) later stages of the process to the point that 
some became “generatively entrenched” and to the extent that some downstream 
features depended upon them (Wimsatt 1986). For example, an interpretation 
along these lines may be appropriate to explain some observations concerning 
children learning German, who do not master the intricacies of V2 phenomena 
until full completion of the agreement paradigm (Clahsen 1986). Moreover, well-
known developmental delays selectively affecting the agreement system seem to 
have a similar cascading effect in children at older ages, with signs of recovering 
showing up after intensive therapy exclusively focused on agreement (Clahsen & 
Hansen 1997; see Balari & Lorenzo, submitted, for an interpretation). This “pri-
macy of developmental role” view does not suffer from the same shortcomings 
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as the “ecological” approach of Bickerton. Well-understood development does 
not entail “development toward,” but “development from” certain previous con-
ditions; its conceptualization must emphasize “processes” instead of “outcomes” 
(Moore 2003). So it is not aimed at certain pre-established goals (Thelen & Smith 
1994), but it is constructed upon mere stages contingently paving the way for 
further stages (Oyama et al. 2001). Within a viewpoint like this, the expectation is 
not that of convergence toward predictably optimal solutions, but rather patterns 
of ramifications of unexpected scaffolding effects.  
 It goes without saying that this is an extremely sketchy idea, but we think 
that it ought to serve to open a salutary debate within a framework in which the 
basics have already more or less been agreed upon. When properly worked out, 
it hopefully could serve to rescue Bickerton from his present state of distrust and 
dissatisfaction with the idea of disentangling how language and languages could 
possibly have emerged through the intertwined action of biological and cultural 
development.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Bickerton’s book describes a really fascinating journey out of the ground of 
proto-linguistic communication into the sky of mental computations, and out of 
the sky of mental computations into the ground of the vagaries of linguistic com-
munication as dealt with by grammars. While we strongly disagree with the 
starting point (i.e. a scavenging related protolanguage) and only partially agree 
with Bickerton’s favored explanations for the underlying motivation of the end-
point (i.e. full-fledged grammatical systems), we sincerely believe that the jour-
ney is worth pursuing and, in any event, discussing. We like MTNN. This may 
come as a surprise to those who followed our debate around Adam’s Tongue 
(Balari 2010a, 2010b, Bickerton 2010); maybe to Bickerton himself, who confesses 
in the book to be ready for strong criticisms (MTNN: 271). But we actually like 
MTNN for the same reasons that we disliked Adam’s Tongue: i.e. for scientific, and 
not personal or clannish reasons. With its blind spots, MTNN is a well-argued 
and well-written book, in which Bickerton displays great doses of expertise in the 
fields of grammatical analysis, language acquisition theorizing and creole 
studies. So we feel proud of underscoring the continuity between our own efforts 
in Balari & Lorenzo (2013b) and related works and Bickerton’s new project. From 
a practical perspective, Bickerton’s is certainly a good and accessible introduction 
to this way of looking at the origin and the evolution of language—and of 
languages—and a most welcome contribution to what above we termed the neo-
Owenian current in biological thought.  
 We hope that Richard Owen would also be proud of all us.  
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